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Play and Cultural D~fferences
!
A world of limitless cultural di ersity has many attractive
qualities. The mUltiplicity of ways f being and seeing evident
in different cultures testifies to ou capacity to extend and
alter ourselves. One productive cons quence of human being's
lack of a predefined essence is our a ility to conceptualize and
pursue an infinite variety of forms 0 life. As Wolfgang Iser
notes, "if what is, is not ev·erything then it must be
changeable" (282). But the irreducib'lity of cultures to one
another's categories and conventions aises a number of difficult
dilemmas as weIl. If the ways of see'ng in different communities
are in conflict because their interpr tive practices reflect
incommensurable presuppositions about human being, can they
understand each other? Or are cultures windowless monads--
one culture use" its own
of one another, with
everything outside the culture's wal seither ignored or
relegated to the status of error? C
same conventions can make sense to
communally solipsistic entities in wich only those who share the
Armstrong--2
terms to say something about another c~lture without engaging in
I
i
a hostile act of appropriation or withput simply reflecting
itself and not engaging the otherness bf the other? 1s any
I
attempt to theorize about the field ofl cultural differences
doomed bec~use it will invariably rema~n captive of one position'
within it? But without such generaliz~tions can we ever escape
our provincial islands and navigate bebween worlds?
If only as an ethical ideal--that, is, as a goai to orient
. I
cur actions as interpreters without ne~essarily hoping to attain
it--contemporary criticism needs a mod~l of trans-cultural
I
understanding which respects alterity without rendering it
inaccessible and which would allow worads to communicate without
sacrificing their integrity, their def~ning difference. I want
I
to suggest what such a model might ent~il by evaluating a
critique of the failure to achieve an ~dequate interpretation of
cultural difference--Edward Said's ori~ntalism, a powerful and
deservedly influential indictment of the cultural prejudices of
Western scholars of the Near East. Said's text recommends itself
because his argument about how knowing other cultures can
parti~ipate in the imperialist domination of them suggests the
political dangers of ethnocentric epistemological self-enclosure.
My question will be whether Said's critique of Orientalism
demonstrates the inevitability of trans-cultural opacity er
implicitly projects an ideal which is the reverse cf the mistakes
it discloses.
Before I begin, I should say a word about what I mean by the
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term "culture." I use it in a flexible manner to designate any
community of belief. Any group with shared presuppositions and
conventions which generate a coherent, distinctive way of
understanding constitutes a "culture" in this sense. The problem
of cross-cultural communication (or opacity) extends from the
disputes between interpretive communities like psychoanalysis or
Marxism to the more global cultural conflicts which can pit the
Occident against the Orient, one ethnic group against another, or
the masculine against the feminine (a cultural rather than
biological problem to the extent that differences in the social
construction of gender give rise to opposing interpretive and
linguistic conyentions). If such copflicts raise the question of
whether communication and understanding are possible across
cultural boundaries, this is because the participants belong to
incommensurable communities of belief. The problems of exchange
and mutual comprehension which interest me arise whenever groups,
whether large or small, have irreconcilable presuppositions. A
culture need not be homogeneous, and indeed one reason why
members of different cultures can communicate is frequently that
they share conventions of a particular kind (are members of a
common culture) which gives them a ground for discussing and
assessing the beliefs and values which divide them (and make them
members of different cultures). Cross-cultural understanding is
an important issue for the theory of interpretation because it
highlights questions about t~e possibility or impossibility of
negotiation, agreement, or compromise which arise any time
..",.
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communities with opposing presuppositions find themselves in
interpretive conflict.
The ethical .ideal which will emerge from this inquiry will
have much in common with the nation of "play" which is central to
Wolfgang Iser's recent work on the fictive and the imaginary.
Although some games are aimed at "achieving victory (establishing
meaning)," Iser argues that play also includes an opposing,
"ever-decentering movement which resists closure" and seeks to
continue and renew itself (252). According to Iser,
"oscillation, or to-and-fro movement, is basic to play, and it
permits the coexistence of the mutually exclusive" (255). In his
view, unsynthe~izable difference is what makes.the back-and-forth
movement of play possible, unpredictable, and potentially ever
self-renewing. Iser proposes that the act of representation be
understood as a form of play because it typically stages
interactions between values, conventions, and ways of seeing
which otherwise might not encounter each other. The results of
these acts of staging are not necessarily aresolution of
differences but a playful, inconclusive, ba~k-and-forthmovement
between them. This sort of to-and-fro movement between mutually
exclusive positions "allows us to conceive what is withheld from
us," Iser argues, without collapsing the differences which
constitute the play-space (261). What we need in order to allow
cultural differences to engage each other in a mutually revealing
manner is, I will argue, "a h~rmeneutics of play.
.~.
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1. "Orientalism" versus Non-Coercive Self-Representation
Said defines "Orientalism" as the systematic, persistent
claim of Western .scholarship to such an authoritative knowledge
of the mysteries and customs of the Near East that it did not
listen to the Other and refused it the right to speak for itself.
Instead of playing the sort of open-ended game which recognizes
the Other as an equal and irreducible partner in an.unpredictable
enccunter, the Orientalist sought the repeated victory of an
established set of assumptions which thus developed "the self-
ccntaining, self-reinforcing character of a closed system" (70).
Tc sununarize, the four "principal dogmas of Orientalism" are,
acccrding to Said: 1) the·assertion of an "absoluteoand
systematic difference between the West, which is rational,
developed, humane, superior, and the Orient, which is aberrant,
undeveloped, inferior"; 2) the methodological assumption that
"abstractions abcut the Orient, particularly those based on texts
representing a 'classical' Oriental civilization, are preferable
to direct evidence drawn from modern Oriental realities"j 3) the
belief that "the Orient is eternal, uniform, and incapable of
defining itselfll, and 4) the feeling that "the Orient is at
bottom something either to be feared (the Yellow Peril, the
Mongol hordes, the brown dominions) or to be controlled (by
pacification, research and development, outright occupation
wherever possible)11 (300-1).
Thus reduced to a list of dogmas, "Orientalism" might seem
so patently bogus that no serious scholar could be imagined to
Armstrong--6
have engaged in it. Although Said's anger does on occasion flare
into polemies, 'one merit of his book is that it takes the
Orientalists more seriously than he thinks they took their
subjects. Orientalism is not a playful book because Said thinks
of himself as fighting a battle for the side which has repeatedly
lost, but he reproduces and analyzes in brilliant detail a wealth
of materials which any summary of dogmas cannot do justice to and
which shows hi~ listening to the Orientalists (although he
doesn't hear them the way they would want to be understood).
Said's summary indictment of Orientalism is important, however,
not only for what it says about a failed tradition of trans-
cultural ?cholarship but also for its argument about,the relation
between knowledge and power: "To have such knowledge of a thing
is to dominate it, to have authority over it. And authority here
means for 'us' to deny autonomy to 'it'--the Oriental country--
since we know it and it exists, in asense, as we know it" (32).
The point here is not only that a scholarly enterprise can be
complicit with imperialism (although that too is Said's claim--
that knowledge, as a form of power, can be part of the apparatus
of imperial domination). The point is also that knowledge, often
conceived of as a quest for mastery and authority, can go wrong
because of the very will to power which motivates it. If knowing
the Other becomes mastery and domination, then the
epistemological authority of the expert closes off the to-and-fro
exchange between different worlds. The openness to alterity of




established meaning which cannot be ·challenged by an Other whose
autonomy and authority it denies.
One reason for this hermeneutic self-enclosure is that power
can easily undermine various tests for validity interpreters
commonly invoke to check and revise their hypotheses (see
Armstrong 12-19). One such test is the pragmatic question of
effectiveness: Does an interpretation work? Said's critique of
the complicity 'of Orientalism with imperialist administration
suggests, however, that the instrumental bias of the pragmatic
test may make it more a gauge of power than of knowledge. "The
vindication of Orientalism" was, he says, "its later
effectiv~ness, its usefulness,. its authority" as a tpol for
colonial bureaucracies (123), but this very political triumph
casts doubt on rather than confirms its epistemological value.
The effectiveness of a hypothesis may be a sign of its ability to
manage a situation but not of its adequacy as a response to and
recognition of othernessi quite the contrary, it may "work"
effectively by silencing and suppressing rather than disclosing
the other world.
The test of inclusiveness--the ability of a hypothesis to
organize evidence coherently, without anomaly--is similarly
liable to being corrupted by power. Said complains about the
self-validating tendencies of "discursive consistency" (273). A
set of assumptions may generate mutually reinforcing statements
whose coherence is a result ?~ the homogeneity of the beliefs
behind them rather than proof of their range of ~pplicability and
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their capacity to fit details together in meaningful patterns.
The internal consistency of a discourse may be an engine for
assimilating otherness to one's own presuppositions rather than
evidence of their ability to make reliable because coherent
sense.
The test of intersubjectivity is perhaps most vulnerable to
political subversion. Said's indictment of Orientalism as a
discipline, a tradition, an enduring and influential scholarly
institution suggests that consensus can be blinding and coercive.
Although interpreters frequently judge a hypothesis by its
persuasiveness, its ability to win adherents may not be .proof
against solipsism. The very force of agreement between like-
minded interpreters may lock them into a self-reinforcing
blindness to another community's way of seeing. The oxymoron
"communal solipsism" may seem like an impossible self-
contradiction, but it is one ef the main obstacles to trans-
cultural understanding precisely because another's agreement can
seem so persuasive as support for one's own beliefs.
The simple response to all of these failures might be to
say: Let the ether culture speak for itself. But in what
language, if the lack of equivalence between the terms and
conventions of cultures is responsible in the first place for
their mutual misunderstandings? And what if a community's own
language is not adequate to describe its situation? Disagreement
about what counts as an "ade~ate" interpretation is frequently
what is at stake in cross-cultural conflicts.
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said wonders "how one can study other cultures and peoples
from a libertarian, or a nonrepressive and nonmanipulative,
perspective" (24). And surely the tests for validity go wrang in
the ways I have described because what Said calls "the principle
of inequality" (151) between knower and-known prevents otherness
from challenging, questioning, and overturning the hypotheses
which claim to have mastered it. The "to-and-fro" movement of
.play depends on·the equality of the interacting positions. But
equality is not the same as identity, and it is the difference
between a community's self-understanding and another culture's
interpretation of it which makes the validity of each an issue
,and also generates the possibi~ity of back-and-forth exchanges
between them. Said is right to complain about the "sense of
irreducible distance separating white from colored, or Occidental
fram Oriental" that "kept the Oriental-colored to his position of
object studied by the Occidental-white, instead of vice versa"
(228). The right to reverse roles b~ investigating.the
investigator would assert the principle of equality (what is an
object can also be a subject, and vice versa), and such reversals
also keep play open. Said complains as weIl that "from the
beginning of Western speculatian about the Orient, the ane thing
the Orient could not da was to represent itself" (283). The
right to author descriptions af oneself is certainly important as
an assertion of a culture's irreducible autonomy and as a counter
to the domination inherent in.being taken as another community's
object. Nevertheless, a serious drawback to insisting on the
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privilege of self-representation is that it would confirm
boundaries instead of allowing them to be crossed. It would not
salve the problem of how to achieve non-coercive'understanding of
another world but would instead leave communities self-enclosed
and unengaged.
Self-representation may also not be sufficient for
liberation. One reason why a culture is oppressed may be that it
lacks a language adequate to expose and protest its'conditions of
domination. When Gayatri Spivak warns against "the first-world
intellectual masquerading as the absent nonrepresenter who lets
the oppressed speak for themselves," she has in mind two dangers:
not only that "the benevolent Western intellectual" may be yet
another version of "the ethnocentric Subject . . . establishing
itself by selectively defining another," but also that the
oppressed people may not possess aperfeet understanding of
themselves or a satisfactory means of expressing their concerns
("Subaltern" 292). The traditional goal of hermeneutics of
understanding the other better than he understands himself may
mask a potentially blinding will to power, but it also
anticipates the insight of the various modern "hermeneutics of
suspicion" (to borrow Paul Ricoeur's term) that a claim of
privilege for self-understanding may be a mask or a delusion.
Even more, one culture may find in the languages and ways of
seeing of another culture the means it would not otherwise have
at its disposal for resolving its own problems and realizing its
possibilities. To pursue its own interests and aims, one
~.
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community may need hermeneutic and linguistic resources available
only by borrowing from another world. Trans-cultural learning of
this kind requires a back-and-forth movement between different
worlds which questions rather than assumes the ~ufficiency of the
self-representations of each player.
The closure of a culture upon itself is an example of
vicious hermeneutic circularity. One way of phrasing the
question posed by Orientalism is a classic paradox of
hermeneutics: How can the unfamiliar be understood if the
familiar provides our only access to it? How can one manage not
"to cancel, or at least subdue and reduce, its strangeness" (87)
if. a community can only make sense of the new and anomalous by
grafting them onto what it already knows? Said charges
generations of Oriental scholars with prejudice, and that claim
in itself would not be so interesting if it did not also call
attention to the epistemological dilemma that without
presuppositions and expectations an interpreter cannot understand
anything at all. If, as Gadamer argues, prejudgments (Vor-
urteile) are necessary to understanding because "truth" is not
simply a given waiting for reason to reflect it accurately, how
can we know without the self-fulfilling preconceptions Said
condemns? Can one distinguish clearly and unequivocally between
a legitimate presupposition and a blinding bias? According.to
Said, Orientalism let its set of available types run roughshod
over the particularities 'of ~~dividuals: "We must imagine the
Orientalist at work in the role of a clerk putting together a
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very wide assortment of files in a large cabinet marked 'the
Semites,'" and· "the human being was significant principally as
the occasion for a file" (234). But no individual can be
understood without same reference to types--to kinds which
; expla'in i ts relations to other entities according to various
t-f classifications of similarity and difference. The power of the
'i
notion of "Orientalism" is indeed precisely its value as an
explanatory type.'
A major reason for the vicious circularity Said rightly
complains about is that Orientalism's presuppositicns are never
put at risk by its encounter with the Other. Said notes that "it
is perfectly natural fo~ the human mind tc resist·the assault on
it of untreated strangeness" (67). Orientalism is an example of
the tendency of cultures "tc impose . . . transformations on
other cultures, receiving these other cultures not as they are
but as, for the benefit of the receiver, they ought to be":
"what the Orientalist does is to confirm the Orient in his
readers' eyes; he neither tries nor wants to unsettle already
firm convictions" (67, 65). Disorienting and bewildering the
interpreter by frustrating preset convictions is, however, the
only way to expose their deficiencies and persuade their holder
of the need to abandon or revise them. Only if Occidental
prejudgments about the Orient are invoked and then not satisfied
can they be altered or overturned. Simply doing without
presuppositions in order to make one's mind a more faithful
mirror of its object is not epistemological~ypossible. Holding
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oneself open to the challenge of bewilderment is an ethical
imperative if one would avoid being captive of one's beliefs.
Because of the dominance of the knower over the known,
however, Said's Orientalist is not sufficiently vulnerable to
experience a potentially enlightening disorientation. Only by
self-consciously curbing the power of one's prejudgments can one
make possible a self-changing testing of presuppositions which
will otherwise r.igidify and endlessly replicate themselves. The
principle of equality between knower and known is hermeneutically
necessary because it acts as a check on the powers of an
interpreter's beliefs and encourages aposture of vulnerability,
of openness to reorienting experiences of surprise, frustration,
and disappointment. Such openness·to change is the only
difference between a legitimate prejudgment and a blinding
prejudice.
The philologist Leo Spitzer describes the hermeneutic circle
as a "to-and-fro movement" (19-20, 25) between guesses about the
overall.configuration of a text and the details they attempt to
fit tagether. Such an endless, reciprocal, back-and-forth motion
is implicit in the paradox that one can understand the parts of
any text only by projecting a sense of the whole, even if one can
also only grasp the whole by working through the parts. The
resonances between Spitzer's formulation of the hermeneutic act
and Iser's notion of play are not accidental, I think, because
only a playful interaction b~tween hypotheses and evidence can
allow them to be mutually formative while preventing the power of
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the interpreter's beliefs from forcing otherness into preset
patterns. Interpretation must be playful to move beyond simple
self-replication of the assumptions with which one begins. As
~:
~ spitzer and Iser describe it, a playful attitude includes a!
~.t willingness to let one's presuppositions and hypotheses be
f;:I challenged and changed by the encounter. A playful relation
,{
between interpreter and text implies a principle of equality
which allows revisions and reversals to occur. Respect for the
integrity and the unpredictable alterity of the partner in play
is necessary for the interaction to be potentially self-changing,
for it to generate something new which neither participant could
prediqt or produce by. themselves.
Said blames the blindness of Orientalism on its "binary"
structure: U'We' are this, 'they' are thatU (237). "The result"
of such differentiation, he wams, "is usually to polarize the
distinction--the Oriental becomes more Oriental, the Westerner
more Western--and limit the human encounter between different
cultures" (46). In Said's view J Orientalism could not see
similarity because it was blinded by difference. Its insistence
on cultural opposition prevented-a recognition of common
humanity: "Orientalism failed to identify with human experience,
failed also to see it as human experience" (328). As Rene Girard
has argued, demonizing and scapegoating the Other by insisting on
its radical alterity is a dangerous and all tao easy way for a
community to achieve solidar~ty (see 1-67). Many resemblances
and overlaps no doubt often exist hetween cultures which a claim
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of complete incommensurability would be blind to, and such
commonalities are important for ~llowing different worlds to
recognize one another as potential partners in agame of give-
/..
t~ and-take. But play requires difference as weIl as similarity,
t ·
. ~ ..~
; and homogenizing the "human" would close it off. As Spivak
i
i.'i . argues, "knowledge is made possible and is sustained by
f irreducible difference, not identity" (Worlds 254). Asserting
the common humanity of the players is a move which could put an
end to their interaction. Binarism is inherent in the nto-and-
fro" movement of play.
A homogeneous notion of "humanity" would limit rather than
enhance the exchange between different cultures by preventing
recognition of the otherness of the other, the defining
differences which give another world its identity as something
more than arepetition of what we already know. The goal of the
play between cultures should not be the eradication of
differences, a move whic~ would stop the game just as surely as
the insistence on the primacy of a single opposition would.
Freezing the opposition between worlds into a single form and
insisting on their underlying uniformity would both result in
stifling or at least constricting the to-and-fro movement between
them. Rather, invoking a principle of reciprocity which respects
differences without collapsing them, the aim of cross-cultural
play should be to acknowledge the otherness of different ways of
seeing and being in a manner.~hich keeps the encounter between
them open to ever new developments. If there is a "common
How "play" facilitates knowledge of the Other may become
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humanity" which play discloses, it is the lack of an essential
nature to human being, a lack which allows a diverse array of
forms of life to .emerge.
The Epistemology and the Po~itics of Play
t\(
, clearer if we compare it to a similar proposal for how to think
about difference. Luce Irigaray suggests that "wonder" could be
the foundation of "an ethics of sexual difference" (124) because
it makes possible a non-coercive, non-reductive appreciation of
otherness. "Who or what the other is, I never know," she says.
"But this unknowable other is that which differs sexually from
me. . . . One sex is never entirely consummated or consumed by
another. There is always a residue" (124-25). "Culture" could
be substituted for "sex" and her point would remain (Said claims,
indeed, that "Orientalism is a praxis of the same sort . . . as
male gender dominance, or patriarchy" ["Reconsidered" 103]). The
value of wonder, Irigaray contends, is that it acknowledges the
irreducible difference of otherness without seeking to master or
control it or subsuming it under some more encompassing
homogeneity which would drown j.t out. "Wonder... sees
something as though always for the first time," she argues, "and
never seizes the other as its object" or tries to "possess or
subdue it" (124). Irigaray consequently imagines that "wonder
might allow [the sexes] t~ r~tain an autonomy based on their
difference, and give them aspace of freedom or attraction, a
~.
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possibility ef separation or alliance" (124). It might, in ether
werds, allow them to play--that is, to experiment with different
forms of self-assertion or combination. The accomp~ishment ef
wonder is to create a play-space where differences can relate to
wonder is that it could deteriorate into paralyzed mutual
If "wender" were made an end in i-tself and did not give rise
each ether witheut ~eeking domination er fearing engulfment.
~




fascination instead of creating possibilities for new forms ef
practice out of the differences it discloses. Wonder alone could
lapse into exoticism--a seIf-indulgent cultivation of otherness
as escape or entertainment which does not take it seriously as a
co-equal wa~ of being. For wonder to support an ethics, as
Irigaray desires, it must be supplemented by a principle of
activity, a notion of what to do with the differences it
discloses so that both parties benefit, and that supplement can
be found in play.
According to Iser, play allows a "doubling" which might
otherwise seem impossible--IIthe simultaneity of the mutually
exclusive" (272). When two opposing communities of belief try to
communicate with or interpret one anether, the asymmetry between
the explanations they offer need not simply result in pointless
talk at cross purposes (although that can happen, and centact
will seen break off in frustration). If mutual recognition can
prolong the encounter, their asymmetry can bring about an




and change both parties (and perhaps give them pleasure, not
merely the aggravation customarily associated with conflict).
I have in mind what happens to both Marxism and
psychoanalysis when Marcuse plays them off each other in Eros and
Civil!zation, or how both psychoanalysis and phenomenology are
transformed when they meet in Ricoeur's Freud and Philosophy.
These are texts which try to hold "mutually exclusive" ways of
thinking together with the result that the boundaries separating
them are crossed without being obliterated. In neither text does
psychoanalysis collapse into the opposing perspective which
engages it. Instead, to borrow Iser's description of the
doubleness of play, "the coexistence of the mutual.lY exclusive
gives rise to adynamie oscillation"--"a constant
interpenetration of things that are set off from one another
without ever losing their difference" (272). Marxism becomes a
way of disclosing the unique, perhaps otherwise less evident
characteristics of psychoanalysis (especially the social
consequences inherent in Freud's assumptions about the opposition
between Eros and Thanatos). But the revisionary concepts Marcuse
proposes (in particular "surplus repression" and the "performance
principle") in turn reveal the distinctiveness of Marxism by
translating instinctual terms into the language of labor.
Similarly, in Freud and Philosophy, the oscillation between the
perspectives of phenomenology and psychoanalysis does not bring
about a synthesis but rather,a variety of mutually revealing
transformations--the need for phenomenology to dislocate the
.~.
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cogito as the home of meaning by recognizing the distorting
pressures of desire, for example, or Freud's complementary need
to invoke semantic categories in his supposedly purely libidinal
~..
~: explanations because meaning is irreducible to force. In both
ti;
,t.
t·i cases interclhanges be~weben mut~allY eXClu~ive perspec::ve~ bring
~. about usefu changes 1n oth w1thout lead1ng to a syn eS1S or to
r a hostile takeover or to a solipsistic breakdown in
communication.
"Doubling" does not overcome differences but can make them'
meet productively. "Doubling" perspectives will not necessarily
unify them (it does not promise the dream of monistic "truth"
some pluralists hope will be realized by amalgamating different
points of view) , although it can disclose potential alliances or
common ground between opposing cultures which neither side had
previously suspected. Nor will "doubling" generate a
transcendental position from which the entire play-space can be
understood in a univocal, uncontestable manner. In lieu of the
impossible dream of an indubitaple foundation for knowledge,
"doubling" describes how encounters between different worlds can
occur, but it is also not a logic which restriets or governs such
meetings. Because a transcendental observation post and a
universal logic are not available, acts of "doubling" opposing
perspectives within a field of play are the most we can hope for
in our effort to get outside ourselves. Difference is not
overcome in same grand, univ~rsal synthesis but instead generates






play is potentially endless.
Doubling perspectives can have a variety of outcomes. What
happens when we double our perspective with another world is that
we cross boundaries that ordinarily limit us because we engage a
~ifferent way of thinking and being, but we engage it as
ourselves, with our own presuppositions and interests, and thus
bring along the world whose horizonswe are stepping beyond.
"Doubleness" cons~quently characterizes not only our relation to
the other world but also our own relation to our own assumptions
and aims to the extent that they are questioned and denaturalized
by encountering something radically different from themselves.
According to Iser, ,the back-and-forth movement of play between
worlds brings about a shifting of "focus" and "frame" (see 254-
61). The Other becomes a focus for my interpretation from my
frame of reference, but that frame is itself the focus of the
other's interpretation, and it can therefore emerge from the
background and become a theme for my own thinking. This shifting
of focus and frame can result in mutual self-disclosure which
would otherwise not be available to either participant in the
encounter. When "two types of discourse" playoff each other,
Iser explains, "their simultaneity triggers a reciprocal
revealing and concealing of their respective contextual
references," and such doubling "allows us to see ourselves as
that within which we are entangled" (271, 283). The
presuppositions and interests which are otherwise invisible to me
precisely because I am so caught up in them can thus come into
'.~
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view. The natural attitude of being convinced by one's
convictions can be suspended and challenged by coming up against
opposing conceptions of "nature"--different assumptions about
what is obvious and goes without saying and consequently is
usually not noticed precisely because it is so pervasive and
common.
The ability to observe our own interpretive habits and
question our otherwise indubitable assumptions which the doubl-ing
of play makes possible is already a transformation of ourselves.
The revelations opened up by the shifting play of focus and frame
allow us to step outside of our previous self-definitions and
cros~ boundaries which customarily limit us. Some skeptics argue
that doubt is impossible because we are always convinced by our
beliefs (see Knapp and Michaels). Acting against such a self-
imprisoning fixation of belief, the doubleness of play opens up a
distance between interpreters and their assumptions which allows
not only self-scrutiny but change. The possibility of wedging
difference into the self-identity of one's beliefs--of being able
to play with them as if they were not inevitable--is a
precondition for extending and altering the given and not forever
remaining trapped by our starting point.
Encountering another community of belief may not cause an
interpreter to convert to its ways of seeing and behaving, but
the very meeting between worlds is rich with the potential for
semantic innovation. The differences between them contain
possibilities for generating meanings which are the unique
Armstrong--22
consequence of the to-and-fro movement between the opposing
positions. The encounter may therefore create meanings which
would not be aceessible to either world alone, novelty whieh in
turn may persuade the players to extend and alter themselves
accordingly, revising their beliefs and goals in light of the
previously unforeseen possibilities which the new meanings
generated by their interaction suggest. The outco~e of the game
may not be the same for different players--indeed, it probably
will not be, inasmueh as they will understand the novelty
generated by their encounter from different perspectives and see
its significance differently because for each it will disclose
and challoenge a different set of assumptions, conventions, and-
aims. What both players will share is the mutual advantage of
having been able to get beyond otherwise constraining boundaries
because of their encounter, but this will mean something
different for each because the given each oversteps is not the
same.
The obvious objection to my model of cross-cultural
understanding is that "play" itself is a Western, ethnocentric
eoneept. And indeed, espeeially in aesthetic theory, the idea of
"play" has enjoyed a long, rieh tradition in Western thought (see
Spariosu). One could argue, further, that the whole question of
whether cultures ean communieate is ethnocentric, the result of
Western preoccupations with individuality and conseiousness, a
legacy of cartesianism whieh even haunts contemporary language
philosophies through their very efforts to get beyond it. Hall
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and Ames point out, for example, that "in Confucian social
theory, a person is irreducibly communal," with the consequence
that "solipsism" is never a problem for Confucius because
"experience is, ab initio, intersubjective" (160). But they also
note that liane always begins to think where one is" (12): "We
have no choice but to attempt to articulate the other tradition
by seeking out categories and language found in our own tradition·
that • can be °reshaped and extended to accommodate novel
ideas" (14). This is true of their recent book, Thinking Through
Confucius, which acknowledges the irreducibility of ancient
Chinese philosophy to Western categories of thought even as it
us~s those categories to. make an unfamiliar cuiture's way~ of
thinking accessible. Their project is interestingly paradoxical
in its insistence on difference and its desire to overcome it,
and the paradox here is that of "doubling" and "play"--setting in
motion a to-and-fro exchange between familiar categories and
unfamiliar ways of thinking in the hope that the encounter will
transform both (by making Confucius comprehensible to the West
without sacrificing his distinctiveness, and in the process
revealing and challenging, if
o
not overcoming, the limits of
Western concepts).
The notion of "play" as a way of engaging cultural
differences may be Western, but proposals for mediating between
different worlds can only come from within those worlds. There
is no transcendental ground from which the conflict of
interpretations can be described and negotia~ed because any
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representation of it is itself an interpretation subject to
conflict (see Armstrong 151-57). What must mark pr~posals for
inter-worldly mediation is not universality but respect for
alterity and openness to further negotiation and change through
the encounter with the other. Although I would not want to rule
out in advance that varieties of "play" might be found in many
different cultures, what recommends it as a mediator is not that
it can claim universality but rather, first, that it embodies a
principle of equality which acknowledges the irreducible
integrity of the partners in the exchange and, second, that it is
open to endless transformations. Built into the openness of'play
is the possibility that the encounter with the Other may.change
the terms of engagement. "Let's play" is an opening gambit which
one culture can offer another, and the response may be "What do
yau mean by that?" er "Let's da something else instead," and
"play" as "doubling" or "to-and-fro movement" would allow the
legitimacy of those responses and enable a reciprocal negotiation
and exploration of possible modes of relationship which neither
side alone could anticipate. Although the proposal to play may
be a_beginning move, the terms of play da not dictate that it be
where the game ends. The possibility of self-transformation is
inherent in play itself, and that open-endedness makes playa
Western nation of relatedness which can disclose the Occident and
the Orient to each other because it does not insist that the
encounter proceed or end on Western terms.
One move which a hermeneutics of play would exclude is
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terror. When, in recognition of the irreducibility of
difference, Lyotard seeks "an idea and practice of justice that
is not linked to ••. consensus," his example of unequivocal
evil is "terror"--that is, "eliminating, or threatening to
eliminate, a player from the language game" (66, 63). "Terror"
is a radical violation of the mutual recognition on which
reciprocal exchange between worlds depends. There. is an element
of terror in Orientalism inasmuch as "the muteness imposed upon
the Orient" as Europe's "silent other" precluded an exchange
between them ("Reconsidered" 93). Terror cannot easily be
exorcized, however, because power is involved even in de-
centered play. The.t6-and-fro movement between positions can
easily turn into combat which seeks to close off the encounter by
a master-stroke or a devious strategem which would secure
dominance for one side. The role of power in the back-and-forth
motion of play poises it ambiguously between de-centered, open-
ended reciprocity and the quest for victory which would terminate
the exchange and, much like terror, refuse equal recognition to
the losing side (the violent overtones of a term like "sudden
death elimination" are all to the point). Something like
"terror" is always present as a possible move which play itself
may tempt the parties to try.
This ambiguity is intensified when the parties to the
exchange seek to decide through it whether some games are more
worth playing than others. Such evaluations are often what
participants in cross-cultural encounters seek. Said argues that
I I
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there is something "combative" in the very notion of "culture" as
the best that has been thought and said because "the assertively
achieved and won hegemony of an identifiable set of ideas • • •
over all other ideas in society" eliminates or at least threatens
the right of alternatives te assert their claims (World 10). The
shock of picturing Matthew Arnold as a terrorist suggests that
coercion and suppression may be more apart of "culture" than we
like to think. The problem here is that being convinced of one's
convictions -includes helieving that they are worth being
believed. It is this belief which is usefully tested and held in
check hy cross-cultural encounters, hut those exchanges must then
be governed hy an e~hics of play based on 4 principle of equality
which opposes the inherent tendency of either side to think most
highly of its own presuppositions and conventions. Playas an
ethical norm requires that the participants agree not only to use
power hut also to limit it, and nothing can guarantee that such
mutual consent will not give way to one party's decision that its
best interests (for example, the vindication of its own
assumptions and values) will be served by resorting to
overpowering tactics. The interests of knowing otherness will be
violated by such refusals to accept mutual censtraints on power,
but those are not the only er the most pressing interests a group
may have. They are the interests, however, on which
interpretation, as the effort to understand the other, must be
based.
In yet another ambiguity of the kind which ethics welcomes,
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however, some acts of violence or disruption and same quests for
power may be justified by the ideal of de-centered, reciprocal
play itself. When mutual recognition or equal power do not
exist, then a struggle to redefine the terms of the encounter may
be more important than "play" and may even be required to clear
the ground for it. In order to construct a play-space, various
power-struggles may be necessary to break down hindrances to
reciprocity and negotiation and to allow an oppressed, hitherto
silenced other the right to speak on equal terms. In such
instances, "play" provides a norm against which to measure
deficiencies which could justify political action, including
fights which are not playful but which seek to make play
possible. Said's "determination not to allow the segregation and
confinement of the Orient to go on without challenge"
("Reconsidered" 95) is an act of moral courage which is justified
in terms of an ethics of play. criticism defined as the
unmasking of oppression and domination (see World 29) is not an
end in itself but is a preliminary battle for power which aims to
allow play to emerge. The necessary contradiction of such
criticism is that it seeks the achievement of victory through a
game which aims at closure only in order to open up play which
resists hierarchies and ends.
A final objection to a hermeneutical ethics of play might be
that it is yet another version of co-optive liberal pluralism.
To some leftist critics, my plea for including the other through
mutual recognition might seem like the "repressive tolerance"
Armstrong--28
(Spivak, "Subaltern" 112) of liberalism which, in the guise of
recognizing difference, actually constitutes "an appeal for
cohesion" and would stifle dissent and "basic change"
(Bercovitch, 644, 645). My condemnation of terror might seem yet
another "form of exclusion which • • • denies its own
exclusivity" (Weber 45) in a typical liberal tactic which,
through a gesture of all-encompassing inclusion, disallows
radical opposition to the existing order: "The only things that
can be excluded are things that would exclude"--i.e., any
fundamental alternatives to the way things are (Wills 318; see
Rooney 1-63) .
On the first point, "goubling" where both parties put their
assumptions at risk is not simply repressive tolerance. A to-
and-fro exchange in which the presuppositions of both communities
are tested and can be overturned and through which their
conventions can be denaturalized and exposed for critical
examination is the opposite of a self-preserving defense against
otherness. Because of the challenges and transformations play
makes possible, it can be subversive--an engine for change, not a
means of preserving the same by assimilating and denying
difference. Play is not taking place if the Other is merely
tolerated and is not taken seriously as a co-equal way of being
whose differences call into question the naturalness and
legitimacy of one's own categories and conventions. An ethics of
play requires that differences not only recogn1ze but also engage
one another, and it i5 therefore not the same as indifferent
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acceptance which can be a strategy for prolonging suppression of
the Other.
The charge of excluding exclusion misses the mark inasmuch
as playas a way of staging encounters between incommensurable
worlds is based on the inevitability of exclusions. I have
proposed "play" as a way of mediating (but not transcending)
cultural differences precisely because worlds can exclude each
other and no.gene~ally persuasive version of "truth" can be found
which would be acceptable to all communities of belief.
"Exclusion" as the irreducibility of difference is what makes
play.possible and necessary. Nevertheless, "exclusion" as the
violent refu9al of recognition to otherness is something I do
reject (as do Said and Spivak and many other critics on the
left), and my reason has been both ethical and epistemological--
namely, that only a principle of equality and reciprocity between
cultures can allow pursuit of the ideal of a non-coercive
understanding of the Other which escapes the self-enclosure of
hermene~tic circularity. The mutual exclusiveness of communities
with incommensurable beliefs makes it imperative that we seek
modes of interaction which avoid the dangers of communal
solipsism and suppression of otherness. Because irreducible
differences in categories and conventions can divide worlds, it
is all too likely that mutualopacity or violent conflict in
pursuit of hegemony will prevail. The question which the charge
of excluding exclusion begs is how interpreters from different,
mutually exclusive communities can find ways of relating to one
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another which avoid sOlipsistic self-replication or a destructive
battle fot power. A desirable alternative to solipsism and
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